THE

AMERICAN LAW REGISTER.
OCTOBER 1883.
NOISE AND VIBRATION AS ELEMENTS OF
NUISANCE.
1. Preliminary.-That courts of equity frequently interfere
to enjoin the doing of certain things as nuisances, on account
of disturbing noises or injurious vibrations produced by them, will
abundantly appear from the following pages. It is not proposed to
discuss the principles upon which such courts proceed in administering this relief; the limits of a short article do not admit of this.
But as this is a very unusual subject of such relief, the interest
centres in the circumstances under which it has been accorded or
withheld in various cases, and in what the judges have said concerning the application of the rules under which courts of equity
proceed in abating nuisances, to those particular circumstances.
This it will be the purpose of this article to show.
2. Noise alone may constitute a nuisanee.-Since the decision
of Elliotson v. Feetham, 2 Bing. N. 0. 134, it has not been
doubted, so far as the writer knows, that noise alone may constitute an actionable nuisance, such as may form the basis of a
recovery of damages at law, or such as a court of equity will restrain by an injunction: Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. N. S. 133;
Cramp v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 409 ; Fish v. Dodge, 4 Denio
311; Harrisonv. St. lKark's Ohuureh, 12 Phila. 259; Wallace v.
Auer, 10 Id. 356 ; Inehbald v. Robinson, L. R.,-4 Ch. App. 388.
"There is," said Lord ROMILLY, "I apprehend, no distinction
VOL. XXXI.-79

(625)

626

NOISE AND VIBRATION AS ELEMENTS OF NUISANCE.

between any of the cases, whether it be smoke, smell, noise, vapor
or water, or any other gas or fluid. An owner of one tenement
cannot cause or permit to pass over or flow into his neighbor's tenement any one or more of these things, in such a way as materially
to interfere with the ordinary comfort of the occupier of the neighboring tenement, or so as to injure his property :" Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 409, 413. So, it is said in a case in New Jersey, "There may be circumstances where even the noise of a steam
engine may become a private nuisance, and its use, on that account,
be restrained by the court. The authorities are abundant to sustain the position that an individual cannot erect, in a densely settled
portion of a city or town, occupied by private dwellings, any kind
of manufacturing establishment, and so use the machinery and carry
on the business as to render living in the neighborhood uncomfortable, either on account of the noise it occasions, or of its smoke
and offensive smells: Davidson v. Ishan, 9 N. J. Eq. (1 Stock.)
186, 190. In like manner it was laid down by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania that the courts have power to restrain by injunction noises which disturb rest and prevent sleep: Rhodes v. Dunbar, 57 Penn. St. 274. To the same effect see Ross v. Butler, 19
N. J. Eq. 294. "Noise which constitutes an annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibility to sound, such as materially to interfere
-with the ordinary comfort of life and impair the reasonable enjoyment of his habitation, is a nuisance to him ;" -Davisv. Sawyer, 133
Mass. 289, opinion by ALLEN, J. See also Wesson v. Washburn
1'on Co., 13 Allen 95 ; aFay v. Whitman, 100 Mass. 76.
Sect. 3. Noises, when indictable as a public nuisance.-It may
be premised that, to render an act indictable as a nuisance, it is not
sufficient that it should annoy particular persons only, but it must
be so inconvenient and troublesome as to annoy the whole commu-•
nity : State v. Baldwin, 1 Dev. & Batt. 197; State v. Hughes, 72
N. C.25. Beating a drum is not a nuisance; to blow a fife is not;
neither is a procession through the street with these accompaniments a crime. To constitute them such, the exceptional facts and
circumstances which make acts, otherwise innocent, a crime, must
be set forth particularly, so that the court can see that from their
very nature, if proved, they are a nuisance to the whole community :" State v. flughes, supra. Accordingly where there was an
indictment containing three counts, the first for a riot, the second
for a common nuisance by the beating of drums, the blowing of
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fifes and shouting in the streets of the town, ' and the third for obstructing the streets, and it appeared that the defendants, who were
persons of color, were celebrating emancipation day, and that there
was no further irregularity than usually accompanies any promiscuous mass-meeting and parade, it was held, on a special verdict,
°
that the defendants must be discharged: Id.
4. Whether nuisance mist be established by a verdict at law.Courts of equity are reluctant in these cases to enjoin an otherwise lawful trade which produces disturbing noises, until the parties
complaining have established that it is a nuisance by a judgment at law. Thus, where a bill was brought to enjoin a glass
factory, on the ground that the carrying of it on produced noises
which disturbed the plaintiff and several other persons in the neighborhood,Vice-Chancellor KINDERSLEY refused relief on this ground,
but the view which he took of it seems to be untenable. It is to
be gathered from what he is reported to have said, that he did not
place his refusal on the ground that the thing complained of was
no nuisance in point of law, but on the ground that it was remediable in an action at law for damages. Among other things he
said, "In a case where the only questions are mere inconvenience
to the parties by the alleged noise, disturbing more or less their
sleep, or in reference to the diminution of the value of the plaintiff's property--in either case the injury is not irremediable, but is
capable of compensation in damages:" White v. Cohen, 1 Drury
296. A learned judge in Pennsylvania took the opposite and only
tenable view of this question, when he said : "I cannot doubt that
a constant annoyance, which at law can never be abated, is never
remedied by damages. The loss of health and sleep, the enjoyment of quiet and repose, and the comforts of home cannot be
restored -or compensated in money. It may afford consolation, but
it does not remedy the evil, if that goes on, to be paid for by instalments. The law operates upon thepast only, while equity can and
will act on the present and future, will abate the nuisance itself and
restore the injured party to his rights: Dennis v. Eckhardt, 3
Grant's Cas. 390. This was a case where there was no substantial
conflict in the evidence. It is said that where the thing sought to
be enjoined is lawful, and there is a conflict of testimony as to
whether it is a nuisance, the question of fact must be determined
at law before equity will enjoin: Davidson v. Isham, 9 N. J. Eq.
(1 Stock.) 186.
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5. Noises wieih ender dwelling-houses uncomfortable.-The
grounds on which courts of equity interfere to restrain occupations or things which produce such noises as to render people
uncomfortable in their adjacent dwelling-houses, have been thus
stated by an eminent judge: "If there were no authority on the
question I should have felt no difficulty about it, because I take it
the law is this, that a man is entitled to the comfortable enjoyment
of his dwelling-house. If his neighbor makes such a noise as to
interfere with the ordinary use and enjoyment of his dwellinghouse, so as to cause serious annoyance and disturbance, the occupier of the dwelling-house is entitled to be protected from it. It is
no answer to say that the defendant is only making a reasonable
use of his property, because there are many trades and many occupations which are not only reasonable but necessary to be followed,
and which still cannot be allowed to be followed in the proximity
of dwelling-houses so as to interfere with the comfort of their
inhabitants. I suppose a blacksmith's trade is as necessary as most
trades in this kingdom; and I might take instances of many noisy
and offensive trades, some of which are absolutely necessary, and
some of which no doubt may not only be reasonably followed, but
to which it is absolutely and indispensably necessary for the welfare
of mankind that some houses and some pieces of land should be
devoted; therefore, I think, that is not the test :" "Broderv. Saillard, 2 Oh. Div. 692, per JESSEL,

i. R.

6. Noises ordinarily incident to certain situations.-Those
who live in cities, in hotels, or in tenement houses, cannot claim
the aid of a court of equity to gain for themselves immunity from
those noises which are customary and usual, and which are the ordinary incidents of the place in which such persons may choose to
take up their abode. Thus, a man living in a tenement house was
denied an injunction to prevent his neighbor, who lived on the floor
immediately above him, from trundling a baby carriage back and
forth over his carpet at night, in order to appease a child which was
teething and fretful. Good neighborship might, indeed, suggest
that a noiseless cradle, or some other appliance should be used; but
in such a case the law would not interfere. "As a matter of law,"
the court said, "if the plaintiff himself was taken sick and obliged
to walk the floor all night through pain, the defendant would have
no right to insist that he should put on india rubbers. * * * Where
people indulge their inclination to be gregarious they must not
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expect the quiet that belongs to solitude :" Pool v. Higginson, 8 Daly
113; s.o. 7 Cent. L. Jour. 102.
7. Xecessary noises in cities.-In determining the question
of nuisance from smoke or noxious vapor, or from noise or vibration, it has been well laid down that reference must always be bad to
the locality, the nature of the trade, the character of the machinery
and the manner of using the property producing the annoyance
and injury complained of. A party dwelling in the midst of a
crowded commercial and manufacturing city cannot claim to have
the same quiet and freedom from annoyance .that he might rightfully claim if he were dwelling in the country. Every one taking
up his abode in a city must expect to encounter the inconveniences
and annoyances incident to such a community, and he must be taken
to have consented to~endure such annoyances to a certain extent :"
-Dittmanv.Beipp, 50 Md. 516, 522. Or, as was said by Lord WESTBURY, L. 0., in a leading case: "If a man lives in a town, of
necessity he must submit himself to the consequences of the operations of trade which may be carried on in his 'immediate neighborhood, which are actually necessary for trade and commerce, also
for the enjoyment of property and for the benefit of the inhabitants
of the town. If a man live in a street where there are numerous
shops, and a shop is opened next door to him which is carried on in
a fair and reasonable way, he has no ground for complaint because
to himself individually there may arise much discomfort from the
trade carried on in that shop. And Lord GRANWORT also said:
"You must look at it, not with 'a view to the question whether
abstractly that kind of smoke was a nuisance, but whether it was
a nuisance to a person living in the town: Tipping v. St. Helens
Smelting Co., 4 B. & S. 608; s. c. 11 H. L. Gas. 642, 650.
8. Useless noises in cities.-On the other hand, the court
have not dealt leniently with useless noises in cities or in public
places. Thus, outcries 'uttered in a public street, although they disturb but a single person, if they are accompanied with the other
circumstances necessary to constitute the offence, are indictable as
a public nuisance: Com. v. Oaks, 113 Mass. 8; Oom. v. Smitlt,
6 Gush. 80; Com. v. Harris, 101 Mass. 29. In like manner a
circus has been enjoined as a nuisance, where the performances
were carried on for eight weeks every evening, from about half-past
seven until half-past ten, consisting of music and shouting, which
could be distinctly heard all over plaintiff's house and in his dining
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room, even above the sounds of conversation, when the windows
were closed and several persons were talking: Inckbald v. .obin-

aon, L. R., 4 Ch. App. 388. So the striking of a clock in the night
time, upon a bell that weighed 3080 pounds, was enjoined upon the
testimony of the two plaintiffs and four others, to the effect that
it disturbed their rest, although more than a hundred witnesses
living at various distances from it, many of them as near to it as
the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' witnesses, testified that it had no
unpleasant effect upon them : Leete v. Pilgrim Cong. Church, St.
Louis Court of Appeals 1883 (not reported).
9. NYoisy trades located in neighborlioods devoted to residences.-In like manner the business of a gold or silver beater set
up in a quiet neighborhood occupied by dwellings, the noise and
concussion of which unreasonably interferes with the comfort of the
inhabitants in their dwellings, and perhaps also with the safety of
neighboring property, was held such a nuisance as equity would
restrain. In giving his judgment in this case ALLISON, P. J.,
referred to a decision of the late Chief Justice TiomPsoN of Pennsylvania granting an injunction against a tinsmith, at the suit of a
householder disturbed by the noise of his business. He also said:
"Everything that disturbs in an unreasonable degree the quiet enjoyment of a home or dwelling-house is a nuisance. A man is to
be protected in the enjoyment of his property against all unlawful
disturbances, if he does not, by such enjoyment, invade the rights
of others. * * * The defendant has no right to complain if the
injunction presses hard on him. He intruded his business into one
of the most quiet neighborhoods 'in the city-a neighborhood rendered desirable as a home, in which quiet and rest could be found.
This was wholly unnecessary on his part, many portions of the city
being given up to business and its attendant noise and turmoil;
other portions affording isolation in which business could be carried
on causing discomfort to no one. While business is to be fostered
and protected against unreasonable objection, the home of the citizen, under the law, has an equal right to be defended against the
wanton intrusion that destroys or unreasonably impairs its enjoyment :" Wallace v. Auer, 10 Phila. 356.
10. Noises proceeding from a business carried on at unreasonable hours.-A lawful trade may be enjoined as a nuisance
on the ground that it is carried on at unreasonable hours.
Thus, where the defendant erected a tin-shop some eighty feet
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from the back building and sleeping room of the complainant, and
there carried on work, generally beginning in the morning before
daylight, and resuming it again in the evening at or about 6
o'clock P.m., and keeping it up until 11 o'clock at night, having
general employment elsewhere during the day; and the affidavits
showed that the noises which proceeded therefrom were intolerable,
so as almost to drown conversation in the plaintiff's house, and to
compel them to abandon their chambers next to the shop, and to
deprive them of their rest,-the court saw in the case no disputed
question which required a trial at law, and had no difficulty in
granting an injunction: -Dennis v.
ckhardt, 3 Grant's Cas.
390.
11. -Doctrine that in order to constitute a nuisance the
noise must be "unusual, ill-timed, or deafening."-In a case in
the Superior Court of New York it was said by SANDFORD, J.:
"Noise is usually incident to the motion of machinery and to
mechanical pursuits, especially those which are carried on through
the agency of steam. But noises are not, ex necessitate, nuisances,
even when disagreeable; and it is only when they are of a character so objectionable as fairly to come within the meaning of that
significant term that a court of equity will interfere to repress or
restrain them :" Butterfield v. Kiaber, 52 How. Pr. 255, 262.
In another case in the same state it was said: "Mere noise, perhaps, unless unusual, ill-timed, or deafening, may not be such a
nuisance as to authorize the entertainment of an action therefor,
even when it interferes with another person's avocation or pursuits ;" and the decision, which was in favor of the plaintiff, proceeded on the ground that something more palpable than discomfort by noise was established by the evidence': .lfcKeon v. See, 4
Rob. (N. Y.) 449. Where, upon the examination of the evidence,
it appeared that the noises produced by machinery operated by
steam in a marble-cutting establishment adjacent to a property
owned by the plaintiff and occupied as residences, was not unusual,
-- that is, was such a noise as is ordinarily incident to the use of
similar machinery; was not ill-timed,-that is, was produced only
in the ordinary working hours of the day; and was not even loud,
though it was audible from some of the residences near by,-the
court refused an injunction on the ground of these noises: Butterfield v. JKaber, 52 How. Pr. 255, 263.
12. Whether a right to perpetuate disagreeable noises may
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be acquired by user.-The carrying on of a trade which produced
certain injurious n6ises for ten years was held not to be such a
user as gave the defendant a prescriptive right to continue the
same, though possibly a user of twenty years, if pleaded and
proved, would have been a good defence: _Elliotson, v. Peetham, 2
Bing. (N. C.) 134. It is said by Lord ROMILLY: "It is true
that by lapse of time if an owner of the adjoining tenement, which,
in case of light or water is usually called the servient tenement, has not resisted for a period of twenty years, then the owner
of the dominant tenement has acquired the right of discharging
gases or fluid, or sending smoke or noise, from his tenement over
the tenement of his neighbor; but until that time has elapsed, the
owner of the adjoining or neighboring tenement, whether he has
or has not previously occupied it,-in other words, whether he
comes to the nuisance, or the nuisance comes to him-retains his
right to have the air that passes over his land pure and unpolluted,
and the soil or produce of it uninjured by the passage of gases, by
the discharge of deleterious substances, or by the flow of water:"
Crump v. Lambert, L. R., 3 Eq. 408. A late English case goes
far against the doctrine that the right to perpetuate a nuisance can
be acquired by user. The defendant, a confectioner in Wigmore
street, London, had, for 'more than twenty years, used, without
interruption, a pestle and mortar in a back shop, built on what had
been the garden of his house. Subsequently, the plaintiff, who
was a physician, built a consulting room in his garden, abutting on
the defendant's back shop, and sought to restrain the use of the
defendant's pestle and mortar, which had now become a nuisance,
though formerly it bad not been noticed. It was held that the
defendant had not acquired by user a right to make the noise complained of, which was neither physically capable of being prevented, nor actionable by the servient owner. This principle was
held applicable both to affirmative and negative easements: Sturges
v. Bridgman, 11 Ch. Div. 852; s. c. 28 Weekly Rep. 200.
13. The question said to be a question of degree.-"A
nuisance of this kind," said Lord SELBORNE, L. 0., " is much
more difficult to prove than when the injury complained of is the
demonstrable effect of a visible and tangible cause, as when waters
are fouled by sewage, or when the fumes of mineral acids pass
from the chimneys of factories or other works, over the land or
house, producing deleterious physical changes which science can
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trace and explain. A nuisance by noise, supposing malice to be
out of the question, is emphatically a question of degree. If any
neighbor place a house against a party wall next to my own, and I
hear through the wall more than is agreeable to me of the noise
from his nursery or his reading-room, it does not follow, even if I
am nervously sensitive or in infirm health, that I can bring an
action or obtain an injunction. Such things, to offend against the
law, must be done in a manner which, beyond fair controversy,
ought to be regarded as exceptive and unreasonable :" Gaunt v.
.Fynney, L. R., 8 Oh. 8, 11.
14. Effect of expectant attention.-In estimating the value
of- evidence in these cases, as juries and courts of equity are
called upon to do, science has offered valuable aid in explaining
This is shown to produce effects
what is "expectant attention."
something like these: If, for any reason, or from any cause, the
attention of a person is specially drawn to a sound, which under
ordinary circumstances would not disturb him at all, it may thereafter become disturbing and a source of serious annoyance. This
is perhaps well illustrated by a case before Lord SELBORNE, where
it was sought to enjoin the noises and vibrations produced by the
machinery in a silk factory. It appeared to the satisfaction of his
lordship that the noises complained of had gone on for five years,
just as they were going on at the time of the complaint, during all
which time the plaintiffs, who were unmarried ladies, did not
regard them as nuisances. It also appeared that, at the time when
the noises began to be a source of annoyance to them, a sudden
noise had alarmed their servants, since which time the plaintiffs
had entertained an idea of some danger from the boilers used by
defendant, and that from that time the noises of his machinery
became a source of constant irritation and uneasiness to them-a
fact which was obviously attributed by his lordship to the cause
named. The noises now seemed to them to be very much louder
and more disturbing than before, and they testified to this as a
fact, though the undoubted evidence was to the contrary: Gaunt
v. PEynney, L. R., 8 Ch. 8, 13. Lord SELBoRNE quoted from a
recent scientific work (Tuke on the Influence of the Mind on the
Body), "that the thought uppermost in the mind, the predominant
idea or expectation makes a real sensation from without assume a
There is little doubt that nervous persons,
different character."
after commencing a legal action in respect of a nuisance, are conVOL. XXXI.=-80
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scious of being very seriously annoyed by it, when, under ordinary
circumstances, they might not notice it.
15. -Effect of conflicting evidence as to whet/er sounds are
disturbing.-In cases in equity the court will frequently be called
upon to discharge the painful responsibility of deciding, upon
conflicting evidence, the question whether the sounds complained
of are really disturbing. It has been pointed out that, in such
cases, a useful principle for the government of the court is
the rule which regards the testimony of a credible witness swearing positively to an affirmative fact, and which disregards that of
another witness, equally credible and standing in a similar situation, who swears that he is not aware of the same fact. Applying
this test, it has been said that, where the witnesses in a certain
house say that they were pleasurably affected by sounds which the
witnesses in other houses agree is a cause of pain, it will appear
that such testimony is not necessarily conflicting, and that the
court is not reduced to the disagreeable necessity of supposing that
either statement is inaccurate. "The similarity which exists
among mankind, while they are well, and authorizes us to infer
that like causes will produce the same result, is replaced under the
influence of ill health, by divergences, which not only render the
sufferer unlike his fellows, but may, for the time being, seem to
render him the denizen of some other world. The sensation of
one patient may be dulled by his malady, while that of -another
becomes preternaturally acute and are tortured by that which
brings pleasure and harmonious sensations to the first :" Harrison
v. St. Mark's Ghurch, 12 Phila. 259, opinion by HARE, P. J.'
I In a late case in Virginia, the nuisance complained of was a slaughter-house,
and the annoyance and discomfort which the complainant alleged, was hearing the
groans and cries of the animals when being slaughtered, and more especially the
offensive odors. Many witnesses were introduced by the defendants, whose testimony, as we infer, was to the effect that they were not incommoded by the slaughter-house in the manner in, which the plaintiff claimed to have been incommoded.
Concerning this testimony, the court said: I11. Many of the witnesses do not live
in the immediate vicinity of the slaughter-house, and none of them, except perhaps
one or two, is near the residence of Mrs. Pendleton (the plaintiff), and some of
them only occasionally visited the slaughter-house. 2. The testimony, or the most
of it, in relation to the grounds of the complaint, is negative in its character, and
not necessarily inconsistent with the testimony on behalf of the appellee (the plaintiff). On the other hand, the witnesses for Mrs. Pendleton speak of many things
that came positively under their direct observation-facts which constitute the
nuisance charged, and they had the best opportunity to be informed and to know
whereof they spoke." A decree restraining the nuisance was affirmed: Pruner v.
Pendleton, 75 Va. 516.
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16. Stables.-Livery stables are not nuisances per se, though
they may manifestly be so conducted. as to become such. A
court of equity will not therefore enjoin the establishment of a
livery stable, although in a neighborhood occupied by elegant residences in a city; sinc4 this would be exerting the extraordinary
powers of such a court against the establishment of an occupation
which might or might not become a nuisance, according to circumstances : Plint v. Russell, 5 Dill. 151. See also Aldrich v. Howard, 7 R. I. 87; s. c. 8 Id. 246; Burditt v. Swenson, 17 Tex.
489 ; Darganv. Waddill, 9 Ired. Law 244 ; .irkman v. Randy,
11 Humph. 406; (Joker v. Birge, 10 Ga. 336; Harrisonv. Brooks,
20 Id. 537; .Horris v. Brower, 1 Anth. 368. But stables erected
in the immediate proximity of dwelling-houses, so that the inmates
of the same were disturbed and kept awake by the stamping of the
horses, have been enjoined as nuisances: Ball v. Ray, L. R., 8
Ch. 467; Broder v. Saillard, 2 Ch. Div. 692. Thus, where the
occupier of a house in 'a street in London had, many years ago,
converted the ground floor into a stable, and, in 1871, a new
occupier altered the stable, so that the noise of the horses was an
annoyance to the next door neighbor and prevented him from letting his house as a lodging, it was held, in 1873, that the fact of
horses having been previously kept in the stable, but not so as to
be an annoyance, did not deprive the neighbor of his right to have
the nuisance restrained: Ball v. Ray, L. R., 8 Ch. 467. In such
a case, the following language was used by an eminent judge, Sir
GEORGE JESSEL, M. R., in Broder v. Saillard,supra: "A man has
a right to turn his dwelling-house into a stable, or his stable into
a dwelling-house. That is not the question." The learned judge
then quoted the language of Lord Justice MELLISH in a previous
case, as follows: "When, in a street like Green street, the ground
floor of a neighboring house is turned into a stable, we are not to
consider the noise of horses from that stable like the noise of a
piano forte from a neighbor's house, or the noise of a neighbor's
children in their nursery, which are noises we must reasonably
expect, and must, to a considerable extent, put up with. A noise
of this kind that materially disturbs the comfort of the plaintiff's
dwelling-house, and prevents people from sleeping at night, and,
still more, that does really and seriously interfere with the plaintiff's trade as a lodging-house keeper, beyond all question constitutes an actionable nuisance :" Ball v. Ray, L. R., 8 Ch. 467, 471.
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"The test," continued Sir GEORGE JESSEL, "therefore is, whether
the stables are unluckily so situated that the noise from the horses,
not being uncommon horses in any way, materially disturbs the
comfort of the plaintiff's dwelling-house, and prevents the people
from sleeping at night:" Broder v. Saillard, supra. And he
accordingly concluded that, "if a stable is built as this stable is,
not as stables usually are, at some distance from dwelling-houses,
but next to the wall of the plaintiff's dwelling-house, in such a
position that the noise would actually prevent the neighbors' sleeping, and would frighten them out of their sleep, or would prevent
their ordinary and comfortable enjoyment of their dwellings, all I
can say is that is not a proper place to keep horses in, although the
horses may be ordinarily quiet :" Id.
17. Pactory bell rung early in the morning,-A bell weighing 2128 pounds was placed by the owners of a factory upon their
mill, and was rung every working day, once at five o'clock and twice
between six and six and a half o'clock in the morning, and at other
times during the day, except that the five o'clock bell was discontinued during the summer months. The plaintiffs resided respectively 1090 and 295 feet from the bell tower. Upon a bill brought
by them, the ringing of this bell was restrained as a nuisance,
although a large majority of persons living nearer to the bell than
the plaintiffs were not annoyed by it, and although some persons
may have had such associations with the sound that it may have
been to them a pleasure rather than an annoyance; whilst the sensibilities of others to the sound may have become so deadened that
it did not disturb them. As the ringing of the bell was not essential to the defendant's business, and was nothing more than a convenience, while it interfered with the rights of the plaintiffs, it was
held that they were entitled to an injunction without having obtained
a previous judgment at law: Davis v. Sawl]er,'133 Mass. 289.
1 In an old case of an information for erecting and continuing a soap boilery in
Wood Street, in London, to the annoyance of the neighborhood, the trial was
before JEFsFys, C. J., at Guildhall-a judge whose name is more unsavory to
posterity than any soap-boilery. The defendant was found guilty and the reporter
has put down the following statement: "In this case was remembered the case of a
calendar man here in London in Bread street, who was convicted before Lord HAns
on such an information, for that the noise disturbed the neighborhood and shook the
adjacent houses; and the case of The King v. Jordan for a brewbouse on Ludgate
Hill, about a year and a half since ; and he was forced to prostrate the same and
direct it to another use ; for that such trades ought not to be in the principal parts
of the city, but in the outskirts: The King v. Pierce, 2 Shower 327.
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18. Church Bels.-Where a church was built upon a side
of a street at about the centre of one side of a block in a neighborhood compactly built up by residences, many of them four and five
stories high, so that it stood in a sort of court with its belfry not
more than sixty feet from the windows of some of the surrounding
residences, in which belfry its bells were suspended at a height of
sixty-seven feet from the ground, and nearly on a level with the roofs
of the nearest houses, and the chime consisted of four large bells,
which were rung at various times during the week and on Sundays,
producing sounds which disturbed a large number of persons residing in the immediate neighborhood and which were, acccrding to
competent medical testimony, injurious to the sick and productive
of disease, a provisional order was entered restraining the defendant from ringing the bells or otherwise using the same, so as to
cause nuisance or annoyance, by sound or noise, to the complainants, or any of them, within their respective homes: H6arison v.
St. Harks Murch, 12 Phila. 259. This was affirmed in 'a modified form by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, three of the
judges, M ROIUR, PAXsoN and STERRETT, dissenting, on the ground
that it was not a proper case for a preliminary injunction. The
restraining order, as entered in the Supreme Court, compelled the
cessation of the ringing at seven o'clock in the morning and limited the ringing for the ordinary services to five minutes before each
service.
A still earlier precedent is found for this relief. In 1851, ViceChancellor KNDERSLEY enjoined the ringing of a church bell under
the following circumstances: A Catholic order called the Redemptorist Fathers took alease of a house adjoining the plaintiff's, and on it
caused a wooden frame to be erected in which a bell was hung which
was rung five times on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday
and Friday, six times on Saturday and oftener on Sunday, in every
week. The ringing ordinarily commenced at five o'clock in the
morning and continued for ten minutes, to the great discomfort and
annoyance of the plaintiff and his family. Subsequently a Roman
Catholic church was erected on the ground adjoining the chapel,
with a steeple in which was placed a peal of six bells, which were
rung at intervals during everi day, commencing at five o'clock in
the morning, and very frequently on Sunday. This peal of bells
was suspended but sixty feet from the plaintiff's bedroom window.
An injunction was granted "to restrain the defendant and all per-
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sons acting under his direction or by his authority, from tolling or
ringing the bells in the plaintiff's bill mentioned, or any of them,
so as to occasion any nuisance, disturbance and annoyance to the
plaintiff and his family residing in the dwelling-house in the bill
meniioned :" Soltau v. De Held, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 133. The learned
judge thought that it was possible that some of those bells might
be rung so as not to occasion any nuisance or annoyance to the
plaintiff, and therefore he did not think it right to say that none of
the bells should be rung again. At that time the feeling against
Roman Catholics in England was much stronger than at present.
It was boldly urged in behalf of the plaintiff that Roman Catholics
had no right to keep and ring bells in connection with their places
The vice-chancellor carefully refrained from deof worship.
ciding this question; but he was equally careful to point out that
this was not a " church" within the meaning of the English law,
but that it was a Roman Catholic "chapel," and that his decision
would not accordingly affect the ringing of bells in any parish
church established under that law. Another very important feature of this case was that the plaintiff had previously established
the fact that this was a nuisance by a recovery of damages at
law.
Going back to 1724 we find a case where the plaintiffs' house
(they were husband and wife) being so near a parish church that
the five o'clock bell greatly disturbed the wife, who was sickly,
they purchased their peace by agreeing in writing with the
churchwardens and inhabitants at a vestry, that they would
erect a cupola and clock at the church, and that, in consideration thereof, the five o'clock bell should not be rung during their
lives or that of the survivor of them. In pursuance of the agreement the plaintiffs erected a cupola, clock and bell, and the five
o'clock bell remained silent for about two years, until "the defendant, an ale-house keeper, being chosen churchwarden, a new order
of vestry was obtained for the ringing of .the five o'clock bell."
Upon a bill filed to enjoin this ringing, 'it was held that this was a
good contract, and the court enjoined the ringing of the five o'clock
bell during the lives of the plaintiffs or the survivor of them, according to its terms. Among othefr things, the lords commission3rs are reported to have said that the ringing of the five o'clock
bell did not seem to be "of any use to the parish, though of very
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ill consequence to the plaintiff, the Lady Howard:" Martin v. NYutkin, 2 P. Wins. 266.
19. Railroad engines in the neighborhood of churches.-It
has been held and denied that an action on the case lies against
a railroad company for nuisance in running their cars and engines,
ringing bells, blowing off steam, and making other noises in the
neighborhood of a church or meeting-house on the Sabbath, and
during public worship, which so annoy and molest the congregation
worshipping there, as greatly to depreciate the value of the house,
and render the same unfit for a place of religious worship: First
Baptist 0hurch v. Schenectady, &c.,Railroad Go., 5 Barb. 79,
where it was held that such an action would lie. First Baptist
Church v. Utica, fc., Railroad Go., 6 Barb. 313, where the contrary was held. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to
enjoin the running of street railway cars on Sunday, on the ground
that, if it were a nuisance at all, it was a public nuisance, to be
redressed at a suit of the Commonwealth: Sparhawk v. Union
-PassengerRailroad Co., 54 Pa. St. 401. It was also held that
an action for such an injury is properly brought against the railroad company, in its corporate character, by the church in its
corporate character: First Baptist Ohurch v. Schenectady, &c.,
Railroad Co., supra. See also Balt. & P. Bailroad Go. v. Fifth
Baptist Church, U. S. Sup. Ct., April 1883, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 719.
20. Noises frightening horses.-It is not every occasional and
accidental noise which might frighten a horse in a stable on a
particular day, that would entitle the plaintiff to an injunction, if
the general case or habitual nuisance alleged in the bill were not
satisfactorily proved: Gaunt v. Fynney, L. R., 8 Ch. 8, 14, per
Lord SELBORNE, L. C. Accordingly, where the bill sought to
enjoin the noise and vibration produced by machinery in a silk
factory, witnesses for the plaintiff stated that, on one occasion, the
horse of a visitor, when put in the adjoining stable, suffered tremors
-- " as to which his lordship said that this evidence did not make a
powerful impression on his mind :" Id. The governing principle
here was that effects which are only occasional or accidental, and
which do not necessarily flow from the thing complained of, are
not ground of injunction, although they may afford ground of an
action at law: Cooke v. Forbes, L. R., 5 Eq. 166.
21. Steam whistle.-It is said that a steam whistle is not
per se a nuisance; but those who make use of it are bound to use
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it in such a place and in such a manner that it shall not become a
nuisance: Parker v. Union Woollen Works, 42 Conn. 399;
Knight v. Goodyear & Co., 38 Conn. 438. " Such whistles are
necessary upon railroad engines to frighten horses and cattle that
may stray upon the road in front of the engine, and drive them
from the track. They are also necessary to give notice of the
Approach of a train to persons about to cross the track, at such a
distance that the bell cannot be heard. In this and other cases,
their use upon railroads is important, valuable, and both sanctioned
and required by law; and in such cases, the usefulness of the
whistle depends upon the alarming and frightening character of
the noise it makes; and one of the purposes for which it is used,
is to frighten and alarm. This is well understood, and the owners
of animals, which often become accustomed to whistles, are bound
to submit to the necessities of the case, and, if they drive them
where locomotive whistles are liable to be blown, they take the risk
upon themselves, and, if any injury results, they can have no
redress. But the rule should be and is different in respect to
whistles used upon factories. Their use is not necessary it all,
but, if used, there is no necessity for constructing them in such a
way, and using them in such a manner as to alarm or frighten any
person or animal. All the purposes to be attained from their use
upon factories can be attained witlgout constructing and using them
in an alarming manner. It follows that an unnecessary alarming or
frightening use of them, if productive of injury to another, is
unlawful, and the proprietors should be. holden responsible for the
injury :" Knight v. Goodyear .4 Co., 38 Conn. 438, 441. It was
accordingly held that proprietors of factories are not entitled to
use steam-whistles on their factories so located, of such a character,
and used in such a manner, as to frighten horses of ordinary
gentleness, when passing upon the highway adjoining their land;
and that they are responsible for an injury caused by an unnecessary, alarming, or frightening use of them : Id.
22. How far plaintiff under obligation to avoid consequences of suck a nuisance-Contributory negligence.- very person is ordinarily bound to take reasonable precaution to guard
against known dangers, and cannot make the negligence or fault
of another a ground of recovering damages for injuries which he
himself might have avoided by the exercise of ordinary care. But
contributory negligence cannot be attributed to a person for driving
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a well-broken and ordinarily gentle horse upon the highway, in the
course of his business, in good faith, although in the vicinity of a factory where a steam whistle is kept and where it may be unnecessarily
blown: Yknight v. Goodyear, &c., (a., 38 Conn. 438. But where
the plaintiff's horse which, otherwise gentle, had the vicious habit of
pulling ithen tied to a post, was fastened by a stout rope on the side
of a public street near a factory which had a steam whistle upon it
which was used for the purpose of calling its operatives, the sound of
which was shrill and calculated to frighten ordinary horses; and while
the plaintiff's horse was so tied, the whistle was blown, whereat the
horse became frightened and pulled violently at the rope which broke
and he was killed, it was held that the plaintiff could not recover
damages, although it was found as a fact that if the whistle had not
sounded, the horse would not have been killed, it having been also
found that if the horse had been free from the habit of pulling he
would not have been killed: Parkerv. Woollen Co., 42 Conn. 399.
23. Injuries produced by vibration.-Courts of equity have
in a number of cases either interposed to restrain nuisances produced by machinery which results in the vibration of adjoining
buildings or residences, or have otherwise recognised the principle
that such nuisances may in proper cases be abated by an injunction. See Wood on Nuisances 553-568. Thus, in a late wellconsidered case, the complainant and defendant occupied adjoining
buildings, the walls of which touched each other in places. The
defendant carried on in his place of business a printing and bookbinding establishment. He had there a twelve-horse power engine
with boiler attached, and six printing presses, four operated by
steam and two by hand. This machinery was so placed that its
power was exerted in lines running east and west; in other Words,
across the building, and not longitudinally, so that the west w ll of
complainants building was compelled to receive whatever shock was
produced by this vibratory force. The defendant carried on in the
adjoining building a saddlery manufactory. The evidence tended
to show that the vibrations received from the plaintiff's building were
so great at times as to render it impossible to do certain kinds of
work in the defendant's building. One witness said that when the
vibration was greatest, the floor seemed to creep under his feet and
he could not write at all. The defendant's bookkeeper said that it
prevented him at times from making marks with his pen that
he ought to make. SeveralI of the defendant's employees swore
VOL. ~XXI.-
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that they were more or less disturbed by the vibration. It gave a
headache to some or produced a dizzy sensation; in others it produced nausea closely resembling sea sickness. Others testified that
when the motion was strongest they found it impossible to do such
parts of their work as required a steady hand and clear eye, such as
delicate stitching and exact cutting in curved or irregular lines.
One swore that on several occasions he had been compelled, in consequence of the vibration, to take his work to his dwelling and do
it there. Everything pendent about the building oscillated like
the pendulum of a clock. The actual deflection of the walls, however, was not shown to be over one-eighth to three-sixteenths of an
inch. The court found it difficult to believe that so much disturbance could be produced by so slight a deflection. The learned
judge, however, said : "I am not at liberty to decide the case on
a theory or deduction based on a single fact, but must find the fact
according to the truth as established by the evidence as a whole.
Unless complainants' witnesses, without exception, have exaggerated
the effect of the vibration to such an extent as to render their stories downright falsehoods, it must be taken as an established fact in
the case that the vibration very sensibly and materially interferes
with the complainants in the prosecution of their business. My
judgment is that the defendant is guilty of a nuisance which it is
the duty of this court to redress. But this conclusion does not
-necessarily involve the destruction of the defendant's business. The
injury to the complainants in my judgment is caused solely by the
position of the machinery. As already stated it is now placed so
that its whole force is expended across the defendant's building and
directly against that occupied by the complainants. To me it seems
very -lain that if it is changed so that its force shall be expended
longitudinally with the building, and not transversely, the injury
the complainants now suffer will be remedied and all cause of complaint removed. This is the unanimous opinion of all the experts
who have spoken on the subject. A decree will be advised directing
the defendant to change the position of his machinery in accordance
with the view above indicated, and that an injunction shall issue
restraining him from operating any machinery in the building occupied by him to such an extent as shall produce a vibration in the
complainants' building sufficient to annoy or disturb them in the
conduct of their business: Demarest v. Hardham, 34 N. J. Eq.
469, 476-7.
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24. Vibration of steam-hammers in a rolling-mill.-In an
action at law for damages, caused by the cracking of certain
cottage walls belonging to the plaintiff, by the vibration caused by
steam-hammers in a rolling-mill operated by the defendant, BLACKBURN, J., in summing up to the jury, said: " The question is
whether this is a case of nuisance: that is, an actionable wrong.
If the defendant, in the course of using these hammers, produced,
not merely a nominal, but such a sensible and real damage, as a
sensible person occupying the cottage would find injurious, that is
a nuisance ; but that which is a sensible and real inconvenience to
property situated in one place and occupied in one way, will be
none to property situated in another place or occupied in another
way. If you are of the opinion that the vibration caused by the
hammers has shaken and cracked the walls of the cottages, you
will probably consider that to be a substantial and real mischief.
If, on the other hand, you think the damage was caused by the
removal of the adjoining cottages, whether that was justifiable or
not, you ought to find a verdict for the defendant on that point of
the case. So, with regard to the cottages standing empty; if that
was caused by the hammering, you will find a verdict for the plaintiff; if, by the want of repair, for the defendant. A further point
has been raised by the plea that the grievances complained of were
caused by the defendant in the reasonable and ordinary exercise
of his trade in a reasonable and proper place. My opinion is,
that in law is no answer to the action. I think that it cannot be
a reasonable and ordinary exercise of a trade which has caused
such an injury to the plaintiff as she complains of:" Bcott v. Firth,
4 Fost. & Fin. 849.
25. Action, by whom brought.-Injuries which flow from
noises are not permanent in their nature, and an action to redress
them can only be brought by those who are presently injured by
them. Such an action, accordingly, cannot be brought by the
reversioner; it must be brought, if at all, by the tenant: funford
v. Oxford, ic., Bailroad Co., 1 Hurlst. & N. 34. The rule is
otherwise where the injury is not to the use merely, but to the
property itself,-as in the case of the obstruction of light: Tucker
v. Newman, 11 Ad. & E. 40. See -Dobson v. Blackmore, 9 Q.
B. 991; Shadwell v. Hutchinson, M. & M. 350. The rule is
familiar that several complainants may unite in the bill to enjoin a
nuisance where the injury complained of is common to all-as in

